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Abstract
The Vlaams Blok is one of the most successful extreme right-wing parties in Europe. We empirically identify contextual deter-
minants that contribute to its political success in the municipal elections of October 8th, 2000 in Flanders. The use of the Tobit II
estimator allows disentangling the party’s decision to participate in an election and its (latent) political success. We find that the Vlaams
Blok is particularly successful in municipalities with a small network of social organisations. The presence of Turkish or Maghrebian
citizens and a high average income also foster extreme right success. Economic deprivation reduces the probability of Vlaams
Blok participating in elections, while a high crime rate positively affects the party’s decision to participate in the elections. The find-
ings on municipal elections are confirmed by an empirical analysis of the Vlaams Blok’s success in the federal elections of 1999.
 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Extreme right; Local elections; Sample selection model1. Introduction
The growth of right-wing extremism is a major con-
cern in many Western European democracies. The anti-
system attitude, combined with ethno-centrist positions
of extreme right-wing parties is considered a threat for
the well functioning of the democratic process. Whether
or not this fear is justified, the fact remains that many
countries have witnessed a growing popularity of these
parties since the 1980s and that this growth in popular-
ity is mirrored by a declining popularity of the more tra-
ditional political parties.
While the rise of extreme right-wing parties has been
observed in many countries, it is by no means a universal
 Corresponding author. Present address: Department of Sociology/
ICS, Heidelberglaan 2, 3584 CS Utrecht, The Netherlands. Tel.: þ31
30 253 48 30; fax: þ31 30 253 44 05.
E-mail address: h.r.coffe@fss.uu.nl (H. Coffe´).0261-3794/$ - see front matter  2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2006.01.005phenomenon. Whereas in countries like Austria, Bel-
gium1, France, Italy and Norway extreme right-wing
parties have been highly successful, in Spain and the
United Kingdom their success has been limited. Several
studies have demonstrated that vote intentions or election
outcomes for extreme right-wing parties are affected by
economic, political and social variables. In the present pa-
per we investigate the determinants of the electoral suc-
cess of the Vlaams Blok in the Flemish municipal
elections, thereby concentrating on four macro-variables:
the economic situation, the presence of immigrants, the
crime rate and the level of social capital. The focus on
1 Note the difference in success of the extreme right parties in Bel-
gium. Whereas the Vlaams Blok achieved 24.2 per cent of the vote in
Flanders in the most recent regional elections of June 2004, its Fran-
cophone counterpart, the Front National (FN), reaped 8.1 per cent in
Wallonia.
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advantage that it provides a larger number of observations
allowing for more robust statistical testing. Also, the inter-
pretation of empirical results is facilitated by the homoge-
neity in the institutional and political setting.
Over the past decades, the Vlaams Blok has become
one of the most successful extreme right-wing parties in
Western Europe. Its successive electoral victories, both
at the local, the regional and the federal level are probably
the most notable political evolution in Flanders, and more
generally in Belgium, since the beginning of the 1990s.
A brief description of the Vlaams Blok’s (ideological)
positioning and electoral evolution is given in the Section
2. As mentioned, our central question relates to four ele-
ments that may contribute to the (lack of) electoral suc-
cess of extreme right-wing parties: the state of the
economy and the presence of immigrants are two ‘well-
established’ determinants in the empirical literature on
extreme right voting. The evidence is, however, mixed.
The level of crime and the role of social capital have re-
ceived scant attention in previous work. In the second sec-
tion we review the theoretical insights on each of these
determinants as well as the existing empirical evidence.
In our empirical analysis, presented in Section 4, we esti-
mate a Tobit II model explaining both the Vlaams Blok’s
participation in the Flemish municipal elections of 2000
and its (latent) vote share. Indeed, since the party did
not participate in all municipalities, we distinguish be-
tween the participation decision and the party’s electoral
success. This is a distinction that has not been made in pre-
vious empirical work on extreme right voting. We find
that such a distinction proves highly relevant. Section 5
addresses the question towhat extent the results on munic-
ipal elections can be generalised to other levels of govern-
ment. A conclusion is given in Section 6.
2. The Vlaams Blok
The Vlaams Blok entered the political arena in the
parliamentary elections of 1978 as an amalgamation
of two dissident factions of the Volksunie (VU). At
that time, the VU was the dominant Flemish regionalist
party and, in the eyes of the Vlaams Blok, it was making
too many concessions to French-speakers. The Vlaams
Blok strove primarily for the independence of Flanders.
This nationalist platform gave the party the stable but
small support of between one and two per cent of voters.
However, at its first municipal elections of 1982, the
Vlaams Blok achieved a first modest electoral success
in the city of Antwerp. It reaped 5.2 per cent of the
vote. In the mid-1980s, the success of the Dutch Cen-
trumdemocraten and the French Front National inmobilizing people against immigrants provided a model
that the Vlaams Blok was keen to imitate. The party
conducted a fierce anti-immigrant campaign in the
1987 parliamentary elections. It doubled its number of
seats in Parliament e from one to two e and won for
the first time in its history a seat in the Belgian Senate
using a new slogan, ‘Eigen volk eerst!’ (Our own people
first!). This slogan was based on the catchphrase of the
French Front National, ‘Les Franc¸ais d’abord’. At the
same time, tension began to grow over the choice be-
tween prioritizing the immigration issue, which was
electorally rewarding, and the original Flemish-nationalist
ideology. The Vlaams Blok chose to follow the more
electorally rewarding strategy, combining it with the
original nationalism (Buelens and Deschouwer, 2002).
In the municipal elections of 1988 the Vlaams Blok re-
alised a local breakthrough in the city of Antwerp where
it achieved 17.7 per cent of the vote. This success was
an incentive for the other parties to install the strategy
of a cordon sanitaire. Through this, they committed
themselves not to conclude political agreements with
the Vlaams Blok. The cordon sanitaire still exists today,
despite being the subject of many debates.
The party’s real breakthrough came in the federal parlia-
mentary elections of November 24th, 1991ea day that was
afterwards known as ‘Black Sunday’ e when the Vlaams
Blok obtained 10.3 per cent of Flemish votes. In Antwerp,
every fourth voter supported the extreme right party, mak-
ing it the strongest political force in the city. The Vlaams
Blok continued to grow throughout the following decade.
In the most recent regional elections (June 2004), the party
reaped 24.2 per cent of the vote in the Flemish region. By
that, it became the second largest party in Flanders.2 The
growth of the party is partly due to its populist rhetoric
on racism and security and its anti-establishment discourse.
In order to attract more voters, strongly worded ideological
texts have been filtered and rewritten, and Vlaams Blok of-
fice holders have taken more moderate positions (Coffe´,
2005). In November 2004 it was convicted for racism,
the party changed its name into Vlaams Belang and wrote
a new, more moderate party manifesto trying to present it-
self as a viable policy party.
3. What determines extreme right-wing
parties’ electoral success?
Many theories explaining extreme right-wing voting
have been suggested. Since we are concerned here with
2 The largest ‘party’ in the election was actually a cartel of two
parties that formed two independent parliamentary parties (CD&V
and N-VA). Thus, the Vlaams Blok became the largest party in the
Flemish Parliament.
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selves to theories that focus on the macro level and par-
ticularly to those that may help in explaining the
electoral success of the Vlaams Blok in Flanders. We
focus on two sets of determinants. A first set contains
‘economic conditions’ and immigration, two determi-
nants that have been widely studied but on which the
empirical evidence is mixed. A second set contains de-
terminants that, to our opinion, deserve more attention
in the context of explaining right-wing success: crime
and social capital.
3.1. Economic conditions
Many authors have pointed to (general) economic
conditions as determinants of the electoral success of
extreme right. Still, there is disagreement about the pre-
cise nature of this relationship. Jackman and Volpert
(1996) find positive effects of unemployment on vote
(intentions) for extreme right. Negative effects have
been identified by Knigge (1998), Lubbers and
Scheepers (2000) and Jesuit and Mahler (2004).3
From a theoretical perspective, a positive effect from
unemployment may be explained by conflict theory
(Blalock, 1967; Olzak, 1992). This theory expects con-
flict to be more severe in regions with high levels of un-
employment. Conflict then translates into exclusionistic
reactions from majority groups. These reactions are
supposed to be more common among manual workers
with low education who are competing with immigrant
groups for scarce resources such as jobs and houses.
These losers of modernity (Betz, 1998) feel threatened
by rapid social change and tend to support radical right
parties out of general discontent.4,5 Negative effects
from unemployment on electoral success for extreme
3 Chapin (1997) and Swank and Betz (2003) find right wing suc-
cess to be unaffected by unemployment.
4 A positive relationship between unemployment and extreme right
voting may also be explained by the reward-punishment (or respon-
sibility) theory that underlies the literature on vote and popularity
functions (Nannestad and Paldam, 1994). The idea is that voters
hold the government responsible for macro-economic conditions.
Low (high) levels of unemployment or inflation and high (low) eco-
nomic prosperity translate into electoral gains (losses) for the incum-
bent parties. To the extent that extreme right-wing parties are often
(in the Flemish case: always) opposition parties, they are expected
to benefit from bad economic conditions.
5 Moreover, in assessing their own situation people make compar-
isons with other people’s situation. Voters with a weak socio-
economic position may evaluate this position more negatively to
the extent that they live in a wealthier region. Hence, income inequal-
ities may translate into support for extreme right parties.right are in line with the clientele hypothesis (Rattinger,
1981; Nannestad and Paldam, 1994) and the issue sa-
lience theory of party competition (Budge and Farlie,
1976). Both offer a partisan view on the relation be-
tween economic performance and electoral success.
Leftist parties tend to have better records in reducing
unemployment (Mueller, 2003). As a result, the elector-
ate shifts to the left when unemployment is (considered
to be) a major economic problem. In prosperous times
unemployment is hardly an issue and right-wing parties
(irrespective of whether they are in power or not) are ex-
pected to win votes. A positive effect from economic
prosperity on right wing success may also be explained
by the concept of welfare chauvinism (Kitschelt, 1995).
This refers to the fact that people exclude out-groups to
keep the wealth they have. Such an attitude translates
into a rejection of redistribution to the worse-off.
3.2. Immigration
If any single issue dominates today’s extreme right-
wing platforms, then it is certainly the issue of immigra-
tion. The theory of economic interest assumes that the
presence of immigrants increases the competition for
scarce resources and that this competition translates
into inter-group conflicts. This explanation relates to
conflict theory. Indeed, one may not only expect conflict
to be more severe in regions with high levels of unem-
ployment (see above), but also in regions where the
level of immigration is high. On the labour market for
instance, migrants are perceived as competitors. Since
extreme right parties take advantage of these feelings
of competition, the presence of immigrants may facili-
tate their electoral growth.6 However, it appears that
even though attitudinal opposition to immigrants is re-
lated to support for the extreme right, the spatial varia-
tion of electoral support for the extreme right within
countries and between countries is not simply corre-
lated with the presence of immigrants (Schain et al.,
2002). In his analysis of extreme right-wing success
in European countries, Kitschelt (1995) does not find
6 Rival theories exist presuming that people who are in contact with
immigrants have more positive feelings towards this community and
are therefore less likely to vote for an extreme right party (Chapin,
1997). Perrineau (1997) argues that the fact that the immigrants
are unknown to French residents in suburbs contributes to the support
by the latter for extreme right-wing parties. Finally, a negative rela-
tion between the presence of immigrants and extreme right voting
may also occur if people who are hostile towards foreigners leave
places where many immigrants live and concentrate in jurisdictions
with fewer foreigners (Martin, 1998). These theories have, however,
limited empirical support.
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migrants or political refugees in a country and success
for extreme right-wing parties. More elaborated analy-
ses (controlling for other relevant determinants) do re-
veal evidence for the fact that the foreigners’ presence
translates into electoral successes for extreme right.
Mayer (2002) finds that the French Front National is
more successful in neighbourhoods where many immi-
grants live. Similar results are found by Anderson
(1996), Knigge (1998), Golder (2003), Lubbers et al.
(2000) and Swank and Betz (2003). De Vos and Deurloo
(1999) find that e within the city of Amsterdam e
extreme right support is higher in districts where
many Moroccans and Turks live whereas the presence
of Surinamese, Antillean or other immigrants has no
effect. This ‘selectiveness’ is in line with the observa-
tion in Meuleman and Billiet (2003) who show that
the presence of South-European immigrants is per-
ceived to be less problematic than the presence of immi-
grants from Islamic countries.
3.3. Crime
Apart from immigration, crime is a central topic of
the extreme right-wing parties in general and of the
Vlaams Blok in particular (Mudde, 2000). Radical right
parties place a large emphasis on being tough on crime.
Hence, it is expected that crime has a significant effect
on the success of the extreme right parties. However, the
relationship between crime and extreme right perfor-
mance has rarely been studied empirically. Chapin
(1997) provides some evidence. He finds that the Ger-
man Republikaner party e while being less successful
in areas where many foreigners live e is more success-
ful in jurisdictions where foreigners comprise larger
percentages of criminal suspects. Regarding the Vlaams
Blok, Van Craen and Swyngedouw (2002) identify
crime as an important motive to vote.
3.4. Social capital
Putnam’s (1993) theory of social capital suggests
that people divorced from community, occupation and
association are first and foremost among the supporters
of extremism. A flourishing social life is a source of
democratic values, and voluntary associations are pla-
ces where social and civic skills are learnt (Putnam,
2000). Hence, they may be described as schools of de-
mocracy. Some studies on the micro level have indeed
shown that citizens who are involved in social organiza-
tions have significantly less sympathy for extreme right
parties (Billiet and De Witte, 2001; Coffe´, 2002).However, the social capital school also claims that the
voluntary associations function as rainmakers, Put-
nam’s term to describe the way in which resources pro-
duced from civic engagement rain not only on those
who are active participants but also on those who live
in regions with a high density of social interactions.
As such, it is assumed that more civic organisations
(or more generally, higher levels of social capital) in
a community dampen the success of extreme right
parties. To our knowledge, no empirical macro analysis
has investigated such a link.
4. Empirical analysis: explaining the
electoral success of the Vlaams Blok
In order to examine the explanatory value of the dif-
ferent variables presented in the previous section, we
estimate a regression model explaining the share of
votes that the Vlaams Blok obtained in the municipal
elections of 2000 in 307 out of the 308 Flemish munic-
ipalities.7 These municipalities have multi-purpose
governments with a considerable autonomy, both at
the expenditure and revenue side of the budget. Their
major competences are in the field of education, public
safety (police), welfare, refuse collection, and so on. On
the revenue side, Flemish municipalities have a far
reaching autonomy which is reflected in a highly di-
verse tax system (the average municipality levies
around 20 different taxes). Within the council, a major-
ity forms the local government (mayor and aldermen)
that is the executive power in the municipality. Munic-
ipalities have a fixed electoral cycle of six years. In the
elections, seats in the municipal council are allocated
using a system of proportional representation (PR). It
is a well-established fact that PR systems are character-
ised by fragmented political landscapes. The number of
parties competing in elections and in the government is
generally larger than under plurality rule. This is also
the case in Flanders. Around 40 per cent of the munic-
ipalities have single party governments. Little over 40
per cent of the municipalities are governed by a two-
party coalition. The remaining municipalities have coa-
litions of at least three parties.
In the most recent municipal elections of 2000, the
Vlaams Blok obtained an average of 10.8 per cent
vote share in the municipalities where it participated
in the elections. This number of municipalities has in-
creased enormously since the party participated for
the first time in municipal elections: from 24 in 1982
7 One municipality e Herstappe e was left out because of lack of
data.
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paign, the party got seats in the council in 154 munici-Vote share Vlaams Blok ¼ b0 þ b1Incomeþ b2Unemploymentþ b3Income inequalityþ b4Immigrantsþ b5Crime
þ b6Associational lifeþ b7Population densityþ b8District magnitude
þ b9Government fragmentationþ b10Government ideological distanceþ epalities of the 180 in which it participated. It totalled
438 councillors.
Concentrating on the municipal level of government
offers clear advantages over studies at more aggregate
levels. First, our analysis can be based on a large set
of data.8 Second, the institutional context e single dis-
trict elections, the electoral rules, the fixed (six year)
election cycle, and so on e is identical across observa-
tions.9 Third, as elections were held at one and the same
date e October 8th, 2000 e no variation exists in terms
of the federal and regional political situation. This al-
lows concentrating on the inter-municipal variation in
the electoral result of the Vlaams Blok, at the same
time controlling for potential shocks in the party’s fed-
eral (or regional) popularity. Besides, we have data that
can help us shed light on different variables such as so-
cial capital and crime, which have been rarely empiri-
cally studied in analyses on the success of extreme
right parties.
4.1. Empirical specification
In order to identify the impact of economic condi-
tions, immigration, crime and social capital on extreme
right-wing success in the municipal elections, it is nec-
essary to control for the possible importance of rival ex-
planations. Hence, we include control variables, based
on the findings in earlier research. More specifically,
we estimate the following empirical model for Flemish
8 The number of observations is by definition a problem in empir-
ical work that concentrates on actual election outcomes (compared
to, for example, vote intentions). For example, while covering
a long period 1981e1998 and a relatively large number of countries
(16), the empirical work in Swank and Betz (2003) is based on only
83 observations. Similarly, the analysis in Jackman and Volpert
(1996) uses data on 103 elections. This empirical constraint is, of
course, unavoidable when one concentrates on actual outcomes of
national elections.
9 Yet, a sizeable difference in district magnitude (the number of
seats in the council) exists between municipalities. The district mag-
nitude ranges from 7 to 55. Hence, it will be included as control vari-
able in our model.municipalities (municipality specific subscripts are left
out for convenience):The dependent variable is the share of votes obtained
by the Vlaams Blok and is bounded within the interval
[0,1]. The specific nature of the dependent variable should
be accounted for through proper use of the estimation
technique (see next section). b0 to b10 are the coefficients
to be estimated. e is the normally distributed error term.
To capture the economic conditions we include not
only the unemployment rate in our model, but also the
per capita income and the income inequality, measured
by the inter-quartile range coefficient. Given that the
discussion in the previous section suggests that there
may be an unequal attitude towards immigrants depend-
ing on their country of origin, we account for this in our
specification. The share of immigrants is a vector that
consists of two elements: the share in the population
of foreigners from Turkey or Maghreb countries (Al-
geria, Morocco and Tunisia) and the share of the foreign
population from other countries. Crime corresponds
with the per capita number of crimes committed.
Our measure of social capital is the per capita num-
ber of local branches of socio-cultural associations
within the municipality (Lauwerysen and Colpaert,
2004). These socio-cultural associations are primarily
local branches of (inter)national associations for
women, retirees, civil rights, and so on. They are both
bonding and bridging associations (Putnam, 2000).
Some organizations are inward looking and encompass
people with the same background. Examples of such
bonding associations include ethnic fraternal organiza-
tions. Other associations are outward looking and bring
citizens into contact with people from a cross-section of
society. These are generally called bridging associa-
tions. Some authors suggest that while bridging associ-
ations are a good form of social capital, bonding
associations are not. They emphasize that positive expe-
riences with dissimilar individuals will have greater ef-
fects on the development of generalized trust than will
the cooperation that emerges among individuals who
are more homogenous in terms of their characteristics,
attitudes, or behaviours (Marshall and Stolle, 2004).
However, Halpern (2005) points out that there is a fairly
high, positive correlation between bonding and bridging
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(2005), that we may not have to worry too much about
the distinction. If a community is rich in one type of so-
cial capital, it is probably rich in the other type too.
Besides our central variables, discussed above, we
include a set of control variables. To control for the an-
onymity and alienation that are characteristic of large
cities, we include population density, expressed as the
number of inhabitants per m2. A last set of variables
in our model are political control variables. The district
magnitude, measured by the number of seats in the mu-
nicipal council, is an indicator of the barrier to entry for
new parties. Lower barriers allow small parties to enter
the political arena more easily. Government fragmenta-
tion and the implied impact on public policy has also
been identified as a potential factor favouring the
growth of opposition parties in general and extreme
right parties in particular. It is measured as the effective
number of government parties (Laakso and Taagepera,
1979). Finally, large ideological differences (and poten-
tial disagreement) may inhibit the well-functioning of
government and the possibility of coalition partners to
take clear stances on a number of issues. This may again
benefit the Vlaams Blok. To test for this, and following
Volkerink and de Haan (2001), we use the maximum
ideological distance between any two government
parties in the regression.
Summary statistics for the different variables are re-
ported in Appendix 1. The data sources are in Appendix 2.
4.2. Estimation method
The estimation method should account for the
bounded nature of our dependent variable (the Vlaams
Blok’s vote share). As actual vote shares range from
0 to 33 per cent, especially the lower bound deserves
special attention. Indeed, the Vlaams Blok did not par-
ticipate in the elections in 127 of the 307 municipalities.
It is well known that estimating by ordinary least
squared (OLS) would lead to biased results as it disre-
gards the latent popularity of the Vlaams Blok in mu-
nicipalities where they did not formally participate in
the elections. Therefore, and following the bulk of the
literature (Golder, 2003; Jackman and Volpert, 1996;
Jesuit and Mahler, 2004; Swank and Betz, 2003), we
proceed by estimating a Tobit regression (Tobin,
1958) that relates the (latent) popularity of the Vlaams
Blok to a set of explanatory variables derived from the
theories in Section 3.
The Tobit estimator makes full use of the informa-
tion that is available by accounting for the popularity
of the Vlaams Blok in those municipalities where theparty participated in the elections as well as the latent
popularity in municipalities where it did not participate.
Such estimator is, however, only valid as a measure of
electoral success defined in terms of the ‘demand’ by
citizens as expressed in the ballot box (or left unex-
pressed if the party does not present a list). While our
interest and hypotheses lie clearly on this demand
side, supply side arguments (i.e. the Vlaams Blok’s de-
cision whether or not to participate in the election) in-
terfere. District magnitude forms a clear illustration.
Indeed, the importance of district magnitude plays at
the side of both the political entrepreneurs and the
voters. Party elites devote more resources in municipal-
ities with a larger district magnitude and the electorate
may not take the risk to vote for a party that may not
pass the electoral threshold.10 Hence, district magnitude
may affect the vote share of the Vlaams Blok through its
influence on strategic voting (demand) as well as
through its influence on the decision of the party to par-
ticipate (supply). The situation is similar as the one in
Hug (2000). This author shows how determinants of
the emergence of new parties differ from the determi-
nants of their political success given that they have de-
cided to participate in the election. To disentangle
demand and supply aspects, and following Hug
(2000), we also estimate a sample selection model (To-
bit II model).11 This corresponds to simultaneously es-
timating a selection equation (participation in the
election by the Vlaams Blok or not) and an outcome
equation (vote share of the party given that it does par-
ticipate). This selection mechanism of party participa-
tion is ignored in the Tobit I model which is used in
most earlier studies on the subject.12 Hence, false con-
clusions may be drawn when using Tobit I. Indeed, vari-
ables that seem to explain the success of an extreme
10 However, Norris (2005) concludes that the effect of electoral sys-
tems works through determining the radical right’s share of seats, not
votes, and states that effects in this regard can be regarded as me-
chanical rather than psychological. Carter (2002) suggests that elec-
toral systems have a different, and possibly weaker, impact on
right-wing extremist party supporters than other voters. Carter
(2002), as well as Van der Brug et al. (2005) challenge the general
theory that electoral rules shape extreme right party appeal. They
find no evidence that a proportional electoral system or the district
magnitude help extreme right parties to obtain popular support.
11 See Breen (1996) for a good introduction to Tobit models.
12 Of course, in national elections the selection generally does not
relate to the question whether an extreme right party decides to par-
ticipate in the elections but to the question whether an extreme right
party exists. Also, estimating a sample selection model for panel data
is less straightforward than estimating a sample selection model for
cross section data. Several estimators for panel data sample selection
models exist and there exists little evidence on the performance of
these estimators (see however, Jensen et al., 2001).
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cision to participate in the elections and not on its elec-
toral outcome. We therefore believe that the use of the
Tobit II estimator is an improvement over the existing
literature.
The Tobit II estimator assumes that the dependent
variable (the vote for extreme right) is only observed
when another variable exceeds a certain value.
We can write the sample selection model as (Breen,
1996):
Selection equation :
zi ¼ w0iaþ ei
zi ¼ 0 if zi  0
zi ¼ 1 if zi > 0

Outcome equation :
yi ¼ x0ibþ ui
yi ¼ yi if zi ¼ 1
yi not observed if zi ¼ 0

As mentioned, the model contains a selection equa-
tion and an outcome equation. The selection equation
can be thought of as estimating the supply by the
Vlaams Blok. The variable z is of course not actually
observed. We do observe, however, zi, i.e. the fact that
the Vlaams Blok participates in the elections (when
zi
 > 0). The outcome equation estimates the Vlaams
Blok’s popularity (or success) yi
. This popularity is ob-
served as the vote share in those municipalities where
the Vlaams Blok participates in the elections (zi ¼ 1).
It is unobserved (latent) in the other municipalities.
When estimating the Tobit II model we will as-
sume the determinants that were identified in Section
3 to be valid both for the selection equation and the
outcome equation. A rationale for this empirical as-
sumption is the interdependence of supply and de-
mand. Expected demand is likely to be a major
determinant of supply: a party is more likely to partic-
ipate in an election if it expects to obtain a good elec-
toral result.
Before turning to the results, a final methodological
note should be made. Sigelman and Zeng (1999) warn
that Tobit II is not efficient for exclusively non-negative
data. The estimation method deals with the sample se-
lection bias, but it does not restrict the value range of
the dependent variable. Sigelman and Zeng suggest
that the non-negativity of the data can be dealt with
by applying a non-negative function on the dependent
variable y. Therefore, when we estimate by Tobit II,
we transform the dependent variable in the outcome
equation. More specifically, the transformed vote shareis v ¼ ln(V/(1  V)) (with V the vote share of the
Vlaams Blok) and is restricted to the interval [0,1].
4.3. Empirical results
The results of our empirical analysis are summarised
in Tables 1 and 2. Table 1 gives the Tobit I estimation in
line with most of the literature. Table 2 gives the Tobit II
results.13
The first important conclusion that follows from our
analysis is that Hug’s (2000) warning e that the same
variables do not necessarily explain participation in
the elections and the subsequent vote share e should
be taken seriously also in the context of analysing the
popularity of extreme right parties. Indeed, a compari-
son of Tables 1 and 2 reveals that e in terms of the
significance and signs of the coefficients e the results
of our Tobit II regression are similar to the Tobit I
regression. Still, most variables that are significant in
the Tobit I estimation have a significant impact on the
selection or the outcome but not on both. This demon-
strates that the methodological distinction between
the participation decision and the party’s (latent) vote
share proves highly relevant. Previous empirical results
on the popularity of extreme right parties e based on
Tobit I estimators e should therefore be treated with
caution.
In what follows we concentrate on the Tobit II results
as given in Table 2. Our main interest lies, of course, in
the outcome equation that tests the demand side theories
described in Section 3.
From Table 2 we see that income exerts a significant
and positive effect on the Vlaams Blok’s (latent) vote
share. Apparently, under favourable economic condi-
tions the electorate turns to the extreme right party.
This observation is in line with Knigge (1998), Lubbers
and Scheepers (2000) and Jesuit and Mahler (2004). It
also corresponds with recent findings on the individual
level which shows that the supporters of extreme right
parties may not only been portrayed as ‘‘losers of mo-
dernity’’ (Van der Brug and Fennema, 2003; McGann
and Kitschelt, 2005). It has been shown that extreme
right parties have been able to appeal to a broad elector-
ate from across all social groups. Note, however, that
the positive effect of favourable conditions is only
found for income and not unemployment (at least not
13 To check the robustness of our results, we re-estimated the regres-
sions excluding the city of Antwerp (the largest city in Flanders and
the municipality where the Vlaams Blok is the most successful). Ex-
cluding the observation did not affect the tenor of our results (avail-
able upon request).
149H. Coffe´ et al. / Electoral Studies 26 (2007) 142e155in the outcome equation).14 Our results may be taken to
support the clientele hypothesis (and issue salience the-
ory) stating that voters will turn to the left-wing parties
under unfavourable economic conditions. They are also
in line with the notion of welfare chauvinism: favour-
able economic conditions create welfare and those
that benefit from this defend their position by taking ex-
tremist political positions.15
From a practical and policy perspective it is not only
important to know whether a contextual variable exerts
an influence or not. It is also relevant to know the size
of the effect. Therefore, we calculate the marginal effects
Table 1




Per capita income 0.024 (3.93)
Unemployment rate 0.799 (2.09)








Associational life 11.132 (1.42)
Population density 22.803 (1.94)








Number of observations 307
LL 147.186
Likelihood ratio c2 194.58
Likelihood ratio prob 0.000
Notes: t-values are in parentheses, significant at 1%; at 5%
and at 10%; LL is the maximised value of the log-likelihood func-
tion; likelihood ratio c2 is calculated as 2(LL  LO) with LO the
log-likelihood of the constant only model.
14 We do find a significant positive effect of unemployment when
we use the total share of foreigners (result available upon request).
When we use the share of immigrants from Turkey and the Maghreb
separately this effect disappears. This is probably due to the fact that
unemployment is highly correlated with the presence of Turkish and
Maghrebian immigrants (correlation of 0.53). This shows how impor-
tant it is to distinguish between types of immigrants when analysing
the effects of immigrants and unemployment on the extremist vote.
15 Our empirical approach does not allow discriminating between
the two possible explanations. Still, in support of the clientele hy-
pothesis, we do find a (small) negative correlation between aggregate
income and respectively the vote for the socialist party (0.24) and
the vote for the Christian democratic party (0.32). We also find
a small positive correlation between aggregate income and the vote
for the (right) liberal party (0.21).on the untransformed latent vote share e that is, y, the
popularity of the Vlaams Blok.16 The size of the effect of
aggregate income is non-negligible. An increase by one
standard deviation in per capita income leads to an in-
crease in the latent vote share of 2.30 percentage points
(which is substantial, compared to an average vote share
of 10.8 per cent in those municipalities where the
Vlaams Blok is present). Remember that in those munic-
ipalities where the party participated the latent vote
share is the vote share that it actually received. In those
municipalities where it did not participate it is the vote
share that it would have received if it had participated.
Table 2
Tobit II estimation of Vlaams Blok’s electoral success (FIML)
Selection equation Outcome equation
Intercept 3.820 (2.43) 2.133 (4.36)
Per capita income 0.354 (2.69) 0.073 (1.86)
Unemployment rate 15.324 (1.74) 1.102 (0.44)




44.066 (1.61) 13.516 (5.50)
Population from
other countries
2.530 (1.05) 0.901 (1.11)
Crime 8.315 (2.02) 0.273 (0.27)
Associational life 162.353 (1.01) 232.710 (4.42)
Population density 293.485 (0.95) 192.268 (2.71)




0.409 (1.76) 0.066 (1.12)
Maximum ideological
distance government











Notes: z-values are in parentheses, significant at 1%; at 5% andat 10%; LL is the maximised value of the log-likelihood function.
The dependent variable in the outcome equation is the transformed
vote share: ln(V/(1  V)).
16 In Table 3 we give the marginal effects on the transformed latent
vote share. The effect on the untransformed vote share can be calcu-
lated as: (b exp(bx))/(1 þ exp(bx))2, where b is the marginal effect
on the transformed latent vote share. As x we take the sample
mean of the explanatory variable. The effect of an increase in one
standard deviation is found by multiplying this effect with the stan-
dard deviation. The mean and standard deviation of the explanatory
variables are shown in Appendix 1. Note that the marginal effects on
the transformed latent vote share e ln(V/(1  V)) e are the coeffi-
cients in the outcome equations of Table 2 (i.e. b).
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find that the share of people from the Maghreb countries
or Turkey has a highly significant and (anticipated) pos-
itive impact on the extremist vote share. This is in line
with the conclusion of de Vos and Deurloo (1999) re-
garding the presence of Moroccan and Turkish immi-
grants in Amsterdam.17 The share of foreigners from
other countries than the Maghreb or Turkey has a ne-
gative e though insignificant e effect. This may be
taken to reflect that immigrants from those countries (in
practical terms: mainly from the Netherlands and Italy)
are well integrated in the Flemish society and that their
presence is more easily accepted by the autochthons.
This striking difference between electoral reactions to
the presence of foreigners from Muslim countries and for-
eigners from other countries shows a difference in (per-
ceived) cultural distance. It is also particularly the Turks
and Moroccans who are targeted in the Vlaams Blok’s
propaganda as the scapegoat for a whole range of social
problems. It is fair to say that the issue of immigration
of these population groups is the party’s most distinctive
issue. The effect of the presence of Turkish and Maghre-
bian immigrants on the Vlaams Blok’s popularity is sub-
stantial. Calculating the marginal effect on the latent vote
share, we find that an increase by one standard deviation
results in a 4.05 percentage points higher vote share.
Voting for extreme right is negatively affected by a mu-
nicipality’s social capital as measured by the per capita
Table 3
Marginal effects Tobit II estimation of Vlaams Blok’s electoral
success
Selection equation Outcome equation
Per capita income 0.120 0.073
Unemployment rate 5.195 1.102








Associational life 55.038 232.710
Population density 99.492 192.268
District magnitude 0.069 0.004
Effective number





Notes: For the selection equation we give the marginal effects on the
probability of being selected. For the outcome equation we give the mar-
ginal effects on the transformed latent vote share. The latter marginal ef-
fects are the same as the coefficients of the outcome equations in Table 2.
17 We find no effect from the total share of immigrants (results avail-
able upon request).number of socio-cultural associations. The Vlaams Blok
is more successful in municipalities with a small network
of organisations. Hence, our results are in line with Put-
nam’s (1993) hypothesis that social capital has an impor-
tant influence on the performance of societies (both at the
political, social and economic level). A dense associa-
tional life allows people to overcome collective action
problems more effectively and at lower cost, which will
prevent them from voting for an extremist party with rad-
ical standpoints. The effect of social capital is large. An in-
crease of one standard deviation in this variable leads to
a decrease in latent vote share of 5.51 percentage points.
This shows that the presence of social capital and the pres-
ence of Turkish and Maghrebian immigrants have the
largest impact on the vote share of the Vlaams Blok.
Our last central variable, crime, has no significant ef-
fect on the party’s popularity. The same holds for our
political control variables. Population density, however,
has a significantly positive effect. This suggests that the
problems associated with urbanization benefit the elec-
toral success of the party (see also Billiet and Swynge-
douw, 1995). Calculating the marginal effect, we find
that an increase by one standard deviation in population
density leads to an increase in the latent vote share of no
less than 2.11 percentage points.
Turning to the selection equation, we find that our
three variables to measure the economic conditions
have a significant effect on the probability that the ex-
treme right-wing party participates in the election. The
Vlaams Blok is more likely to present lists in high in-
come, low unemployment and low inequality municipal-
ities.18 Lacking a (formal) model of the supply decision,
it is not evident to draw clear-cut conclusions from
this.19 Crucial to us is that by taking into account the
18 These effects are sizeable. Table 3 gives the marginal effects (com-
puted at the sample mean) on the probability of being selected (here,
the probability that the Vlaams Blok participates in the election) for
the models in Table 2. In municipalities with one standard deviation
higher (than average) income, the probability that the Vlaams Blok
participates in the elections is around 17.76 percentage points higher
(we get this number by multiplying the marginal effect on the proba-
bility of being selected (0.120) by the standard deviation (1.48)). An
unemployment rate that is one standard deviation lower leads to a 9.87
higher probability of a Vlaams Blok list. A standard deviation in-
crease in inequality, translates in a 19.72 percentage points lower
probability of a Vlaams Blok presence in the municipality.
19 For example: the positive effect of income may reflect the sup-
ply-effect of the party participating in elections as it expects sizeable
electoral support (as evidenced by the outcome equation discussed
above). Alternatively, a positive effect of income on the participation
decision may indicate that formally organising a local division of
a party is easier in richer municipalities (where setting up any type
of organisation may be facilitated because setting up an organisation
has a non-negligible monetary cost).
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mand effects that are the central interest of our analysis,
as discussed above. The analysis in Table 2 demonstrates
the relevance of using the appropriate Tobit II estima-
tor. Indeed, comparison with Table 1 shows that esti-
mating by Tobit I as is done in most previous research
on the subject would lead us to conclude that income
inequality has a negative impact on extreme right vot-
ing. Our current result questions this finding and sug-
gests that this empirical effect may mainly be due to
supply side effects. Similar conclusions can be drawn
with respect to the observed effect from crime. Table
2 reveals that the Vlaams Blok is more likely to pres-
ent a list in the elections in those municipalities that
are confronted with higher levels of crime. A rise in
the crime rate with one standard deviation increases
the probability of a Vlaams Blok presence with 9.30
percentage points. This may reflect the fact that the
party expects to reach higher levels of popularity in
‘problematic’ areas. That this ‘crime-effect’ is not ap-
parent in the outcome equation shows that the level of
crime does not e after all e influence the party’s suc-
cess as much as expected (hoped?) by the Vlaams
Blok.
With regard to the political control variables, we find
that the effective number of government parties has
a significant positive effect on the probability of
a Vlaams Blok list. This suggests a politically frag-
mented context benefits the existence of an extreme
right party. A standard deviation increase in government
parties increases the probability of a Vlaams Blok
list with 8.40 percentage points. Of course, one
could add that the causality could be the reverse, i.e.
the presence of the Vlaams Blok leads to more politi-
cally fragmented governments.20 The district magni-
tude has the expected positive effect on the supply
decision. The Vlaams Blok is more likely to present
lists in municipalities with larger district magnitude.
This confirms the result obtained in Golder (2003)
and Swank and Betz (2003) for a sample of European
countries. A larger number of seats in the municipal
council makes it easier for a relatively young political
party (like the Vlaams Blok) to enter the political
arena. Calculating the marginal effect demonstrates
that district magnitude has a very powerful effect on
20 To test for this, we estimated our model, leaving out the munic-
ipalities where the Vlaams Blok was present in the previous elec-
tions of 1994 (i.e. those municipalities where the causality might
be reverse). We did not find an effect of the effective number of
government parties anymore. The absence of an effect in this
subsample suggests the hypothesis of reverse causality might be
true.the probability of the Vlaams Blok participating in the
elections. A standard deviation increase in the district
magnitude increases the probability of Vlaams Blok’s
presence with no less than 42.64 percentage points.
Clearly, the district magnitude has the largest effect
on the likelihood that the Vlaams Blok participates in
municipal elections. That the district magnitude fails
to reach statistical significance in the outcome equation,
shows that the district magnitude does not make any
difference to voters considering casting a vote for the
Vlaams Blok. Generally, what may be referred to as
the political opportunity structure thus particularly
plays a role in the party’s decision to participate in
elections. It determines whether the party will partici-
pate in elections, but does not explain its subsequent
success. Hence, our study challenges the agreement in
much of the literature that the political opportunity
structure in general and the district magnitude in
particular affects the electoral outcome of extreme right
parties.
5. Generalising to other levels of government
The results obtained in the previous section point
towards a clear effect of economic and particularly
social determinants on the electoral popularity of the
Vlaams Blok in the municipal elections. A crucial ques-
tion is whether our findings on municipal elections can
be generalised to higher levels of government (notably
to the Vlaams Blok’s success in federal elections). To
test this, we repeat the regression for the municipal elec-
tions as presented in Section 4, now using data on the
federal election nearest to the municipal election of
2000. This federal election was held on June 13th, 1999.
Unfortunately, there are no federal vote results avail-
able at the municipal level. The lowest level for which
election results are available is the canton (Flanders
has 103 cantons). Hence, the dependent variable is the
vote share of the Vlaams Blok at the cantonal level in
the federal elections of 1999. The empirical specifica-
tion corresponds with an adapted version of the specifi-
cation in the previous section:
Vote share Vlaams Blok
¼ b0 þ b1Incomeþ b2Unemployment
þb3Immigrantsþ b4Crimeþ b5Associational life
þb6Population densityþ b7District magnitudeþ e
Due to lack of data at the cantonal level we cannot
account for income inequality. Also, there are no crime
152 H. Coffe´ et al. / Electoral Studies 26 (2007) 142e155data available prior to 2000. Therefore we use the 2000
crime data for the 1999 election. The number of socio-
cultural associations per capita is from Lauwerysen and
Colpaert (2004) who collected the data in 2001. Regard-
ing the political control variables, we include the dis-
trict magnitude. It should be noted, however, that the
district magnitude is defined at a higher level than the
canton (there are several cantons in an electoral dis-
trict). For each canton we introduce the district magni-
tude of the district to which it belongs. As the federal
government was the same for every canton, we do not
include the fragmentation and ideological distance of
the government in the model.
We estimate the regression by OLS. The Vlaams
Blok is present in every canton, so estimation by Tobit
is not in order (there are only non-zero observations).
As in the previous section we transform the dependent
variable (v ¼ ln(V/(1  V)), with V the vote share of
the Vlaams Blok). The results of our regressions are
shown in Table 4. Since the Vlaams Blok participated
in all cantons, these regressions regard the electoral re-
sults of the extreme right party. Hence, the results can
be compared with the Tobit II outcome equation for the
municipal level (Table 2). From this comparison, it is
clear that the observations made at the municipal level
broadly hold when analysing federal elections data. We
again find a significant impact of the income, the num-
ber of socio-cultural associations, the proportion of
Turkish and Maghrebian immigrants and population
density on the party’s electoral outcome. The coeffi-
cients also have the same sign as in the municipal
regressions. We can thus conclude that the results of
Section 4 appear to generalise to the federal level. The
only difference is that here immigrants from other
Table 4
OLS estimation of Vlaams Blok’s vote share in federal elections 1999
Vlaams Blok vote share
Intercept 2.630*** (6.43)
Per capita income 0.052* (1.84)
Unemployment rate 2.344 (1.35)
Foreign population
Population from Maghreb and Turkey 7.096*** (2.99)
Population from other countries 1.542* (1.73)
Crime 0.804 (0.77)
Associational life 111.149** (2.22)
Population density 277.534** (2.47)
District magnitude 0.006 (0.79)
Number of observations 103
Adjusted R squared 0.518
Notes: t-values are in parentheses. The dependent variable is the trans-
formed vote share: ln(V/(1  V)).countries (than Turkey or the Maghreb) appear to have
a significantly negative effect on the vote for the Vlaams
Blok.
6. Conclusion
Since it entered the Flemish (and Belgian) politi-
cal arena, the extreme right-wing Vlaams Blok has
been highly successful. Its first successes in the city
and the province of Antwerp have been followed
by electoral progress in the rest of Flanders. Led
by theories in the field of extreme right-wing voting
which focus respectively on the economic conditions,
the presence of immigrants, the crime rate and the
level of social capital, we analyse the electoral
success of the Vlaams Blok using data on the 2000
municipal elections. An analysis at the local level
of government allows us to empirically assess the
contextual determinants of actual election results (as
opposed to vote intentions) and still have a sizeable
amount of observations. Analysing the Flemish case
has the advantage that all municipal elections are
held on the same date and that e as a consequence
of the cordon sanitaire e the Vlaams Blok is a
‘systematic’ opposition party. This facilitates inter-
municipal comparison. Yet, the Vlaams Blok did
not participate in all municipalities. To account for
this, we use a Tobit II estimator that distinguishes
an outcome equation from a selection equation. The
outcome equation investigates the relevance of the
theories described in Section 3 and looks at the effect
of economic conditions, immigrants, social capital
and crime on the latent popularity of the Vlaams
Blok. The selection equation analyses which variables
explain the party’s participation in the elections.
Our study demonstrates the relevance of this method:
some of the contextual variables explain the
Vlaams Blok’s participation in the elections, while
others help in explaining the subsequent success at
the polls.
As regards the economic determinants, we find that
the Vlaams Blok is supported more heavily in more
prosperous municipalities (higher income). Participa-
tion by the Vlaams Blok is also more likely in
prosperous municipalities with a low level of unem-
ployment and low income inequality. This is in line
with the concept of welfare chauvinism, which states
that people who benefit from favourable economic con-
ditions defend their position and do not want to share
their goods with people who are less well-off. As
such, we confirm recent findings in the empirical liter-
ature which show that the electorate of extreme right
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nity. Our result also corresponds with the observation
that Spain, with one of the highest unemployment rates,
has little extreme right activity, whereas the recent suc-
cess of the extreme right in Austria and Switzerland
took place in countries with relatively low levels of
unemployment (Eatwell, 2000). The finding that fa-
vourable economic conditions have a positive effect
on the Vlaams Blok’s support may also be explained
by the concept of issue salience. As economic issues be-
come less salient, issues such as immigration get more
attention and this benefits the Vlaams Blok.
The presence of Turkish or Maghrebian citizens has
a positive effect on the Vlaams Blok’s popularity. We do
not find an effect for the number of foreigners in gen-
eral. This suggests that it is not so much the presence
of foreigners, but rather the fear of the Islamic way of
living that leads to extreme right voting.
With regard to contextual variables which have
received only little attention in the extreme right studies,
we find that the Vlaams Blok is more successful in
municipalities with a low number of associations.
Hence, we subscribe Putnam’s (2000) focus on civic en-
gagement for the socialization to and reproduction of
democratic values. Yet, it has no effect on the probability
of a Vlaams Blok list. The level of crime on the other
hand, is significantly higher in municipalities where
the Vlaams Blok participates in the elections, but it
does not determine the party’s electoral success.
Our results e which generalize to the federal
level e demonstrate that considering contextual
determinants is indispensable in any inquiry into
the electoral success of extreme right-wing parties.
Basing such empirical work on actual electoral
outcomes at the municipal level has proven to be a pro-
ductive research strategy, particularly since we have
been able to include variables such as social capital
and crime that have rarely been studied empirically.
As such, our analysis sheds new light on the study
of the success of extreme right parties, and clearly
supports the inclusion of additional variables e such
as income, crime and social capital e in research on
extreme right parties.
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